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I NAFfA and Agriculture:
 
A Study of the Results of the North American Free Trade
I Agreement on Agriculture with a Focus on
 the U.S. and Mexican Beef Cattle Industries
 
I 
I On January 1, 1994, the United States officially undertook the most 
'. 
comprehensive trade agreement in its history. The North American Free Trade 
agreement has been a great experiment in the tenets of free trade and also in regional 
,I trade. It is a unique agreement in that it links a developing country with the world's 
largest industrial economy. The agreement has now been in effect for three years and we II: 
are beginning to witness the results of its policies. Particularly in the United States and 
I Mexico, the agreement has had a noticeable impact. 
I
 As a sector of vital importance to all three countries, agriculture was treated with
 
special care. The bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States provides a 
I basis from which to examine NAFTA's influence on agricultural trade between the 
I
 neighbors. An examination ofNAFTA's impact on the beef cattle industry (an industry
 
of considerable importance to both economies) provides some insight into the changes 
I experienced by the agricultural sector as a whole. As a discussion of the industry will 
II illustrate, NAFTA has been beneficial not only to American beef producers, but to U. S. 
and Mexican agriculture as a whole. 
,11 
I
 
I
 
I: 
II Free Trade 
I In its most basic form, "free trade is the policy of allowing people of one country 
to buy and sell from other countries without restrictions."l The original version of freeI trade is attributed to late eighteenth century British economist Adam Smith. Smith 
I argued that each rational individual is motivated to pursue his own best interest. In 
pursuing their own interests, individuals frequently promote the interests of the society asI 
a whole "more effectually than when [they] really intend to promote it.,,2 The pursuit by 
I, individuals of their own interests creates an "invisible hand" which in tum directs the 
'I activities of the market. Smith thus advocated the elimination of government 
intervention in matters of the economy.3 Regulations by governments designed to 
I provide the home-market with a monopoly in a particular good are in almost all cases, 
according to Smith, useless or hurtful. 4 Such a regulation is useless when a product cantI,' 
be provided at the same price by both domestic and foreign industry because, all else 
I being equal, consumers will tend to favor the home trade over the foreign trade. 5 The 
I regulation is hurtful if the good can be produced by the foreign competitor at a lower 
price than by the domestic producer. Common sense dictates that an individual would I, 
never attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make 
than buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but 
II buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to 
I 
make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to 
make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different 
artifices. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole 
I I Chapter preface. Is Free Trade the Best Trading System? David L. Bender, publ. Greenhaven Press
 
Ii
 
(1991) 16.
 
2 Adam Smith. "Of Restraints Upon the Importation from Foreign Countries of Such Goods as Can Be
 
Produced at Home" An InqUiry into the Nature and Causes a/the Wealth a/Nations New York: Random
 
I
 
House, Inc. (1937) 423.
 
3 Peter Gray. Free Trade or Protection: A Pragmatic Analysis The Macmillan Press Ltd. (1985) 8.
 
4 Ibid.
 
, Smith 424.
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I, industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their 
neighbors, and to purchase with a part of its produce... 6 
I 
I It is this division of labor (or specialization of occupation) among individuals that makes 
all work more meaningful and more productive7 Smith applied these observations of 
individual behavior to nation-states. As independent actors in the world economy,I 
nation-states share the same basic goals as the individual consumer. If a foreign country 
I, can supply a good cheaper than the domestic country can make it, it is to the advantage of 
I, the domestic country to purchase the foreign product8 As a result, according to Smith's 
argument "free trade" is universally beneficial when each nation can produce some 
I 
particular commodity more efficiently [can have an absolute advantage] than any other.,,9 
Another British economist, David Ricardo extends Smith's contentions to include 
'I, 
even those countries that do not enjoy an absolute advantage in the production of any 
I good. Like Smith, Ricardo explains that in a perfectly free market, "each country 
I naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficial to 
I 
each.,,10 Likewise he agrees that this pursuit of individual advantage serves to advance 
I the universal good of the country as a whole. By rewarding ingenuity and stimulating 
competition, the search for personal advancement "distributes labor most effectively and 
most economically...[and increases] the general mass of productions.,,1I In doing so, it 
Ii also has the effect of binding together all nations of the world. Without foreign trade, 
I, each country would be forced to devote a greater portion of capital and industry to the 
I 6 Ibid. 1 Chapter Preface 20. 
, Smith 424. 
I 9 George Crane and Abla Amawi. The Theoreticol Evolution o/International Political Economy Oxford University Press, New York (1991) 7. 
10 David Ricardo "On Foreign Trade" Principles o/Political &onomy and Taxation London: John Murray 
I (1819) 144. \I Ibid. 
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I, production of commodities that were needed but not efficiently produced by that 
particular country, rather than concentrating resources on the goods the country was able 
to produce more efficiently, 
In his famous wine and cloth example, Ricardo explains how trade is based on
.'
I 
I comparative costs rather than absolute advantage, Ricardo illustrates his theory of 
comparative advantage using the example of Portugal as an efficient wine producer and 
I England as an efficient producer of cloth. He explains that the quantity of wine Portugal 
I is willing to give to England in exchange for cloth "is not determined by the respective 
quantities of labor devoted to the production of each, as it would be, if both commodities 
'.' were manufactured" in one country or the other. 
12 
I In his example, England requires the labor of 100 men for one year to produce 
cloth and 120 men for one year to produce wine. Because England produces cloth more 
'I' 
efficiently than wine, she would "find it in her interest to import wine, and to purchase it 
I by the exportation of cloth.,,13 In Portugal, production of wine necessitates the labor of 
I eighty men for one year while cloth requires ninety men for that amount of time. As a 
result, it is advantageous for Portugal to export wine in exchange for cloth even though 
I, cloth production in Portugal is more efficient than in England. This is because it 
would be advantageous to [portugal] rather to employ her capital in the 
II 
production of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, 
than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the 
cultivation ofvines to the manufacture of cloth. 14 
'I' 
Thus in terms oflabor, the produce of the labor of 100 Englishmen would be 
I given for the produce of the labor of eighty Portuguese. Individuals of the same country 
I 
12 Ibid., 148.
 
13 Ibid., 146.
I 14 Ibid.
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I, could not make this exchange but due to the relative difficulty with which labor and 
capital moves from one country to another, such trade is not only possible, but practical. 15 
.' 
Ricardo reaffirms Smith's belief that government intervention in the market, at least in 
terms of protectionist measures, is undesirable because it diverts resources from those 
I sectors possessing a natural comparative advantage in favor of those that are unable to 
operate as efficiently. 16 
.' The ideas of Smith and Ricardo are credited as being the foundation for the 
.'
modern study of the international political economy. Due chiefly to their work, "liberal 
analysis conceptualizes political economy almost wholly in terms of interrelationships
'. among rational individuals.,,17 In this case, individuals include not only individual 
I	 consumers but also individual groups and individual nations. 18 Of course the theories of 
Smith and Ricardo are still theories, albeit with considerable evidence on their side. Pure
'I' 
free trade does not exist. Its tenets have never been fully tested. Even in the most
 
I advanced liberal trade circles, regulations and barriers to the free exchange of goods and
 
I
 services remain intact.
 
Instead of free trade, most of the world has adopted a system of "liberalized" 
I 
I trade. The period immediately following the Second World War marked a significant 
shift in the international economic regime. Convinced that the economies of the world 
were inextricably linked and that only by linking them even more closely could 
I worldwide peace be maintained, the United States as hegemon established the framework 
,I for today's Liberal International Economic Order. The formation of the General 
'I
•
15 Ibid. 148. 
16 Michael Lusztig. Risking Free Trade: The Politics a/Trade in Britain, Canada, Mexico and the United 
States University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh (1996) 2. 
17 Crane 8. 
' 
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I Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 reaffirmed that order and has urged
 
I progressive worldwide liberalization since that time.
 
I,
 The basic goal of liberalization is again, the elimination of as many regulations
 
and barriers to the free exchange of goods and services as possible or the erection and
 
I implementation of policies designed to facilitate free trade. Political considerations
 
dictate that pure free trade cannot exist without at least a partial restructuring of the
I 
current nation-state system. Even in its somewhat limited form, however the benefits and
 
.' 
disadvantages ofliberalized trade are readily apparent and are hotly debated by the
 
I
 citizens and leaders ofvirtually all countries of the world.
 
I Benefits of Free Trade 
I'
 In many ways the benefits of free trade are the same as the benefits of trade in
 
general. Those who favor free trade speak of themselves as favoring trade. The 
I 
I existence ofgains from trade has become "the basis for the modern formal argument for 
free trade.,,]9 Free trade achieves the greatest level of output for a given resource. As a 
result, any regulation restricting "the free flow of goods and services among nations must 
I
 
I necessarily reduce global output, and ...global welfare." 20 A 1939 study by Samuelson
 
proves that in a competitive equilibrium, regardless of what commodity and factor prices
 
I,
 may be, trade always leads to the greatest gain.
 
I·
 
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage illustrates that even in cases in which
 
one country is more efficient at producing everything than another country and when as a
 
result producers in the less-efficient economy must pay lower wages to compete, free I 
1. Ibid. 
I 19 Gray 9. 
I 6 
I 
I trade is beneficial to both. 21 The explanation for this is that trade stimulates exports, the 
I production of which requires heavy use oflocally abundant resources and it stimulates 
imports whose production necessitates resources that are not readily locally available. 22 
I Of course the economic success of the theory rests on the elimination of 
I regulations on trade. Tariffs, though frequently beneficial (in the short run at least) to 
domestic producers and even to the government collecting the duties, reduce the general 
I welfare by forcing higher prices on domestic consumers as well as a loss of consumer 
I surplus. 23 In the long run, domestic producers also suffer because tariffs tend to reduce 
the variety of capital available to them. 24 I Far from its purely economic benefits however, free trade also has a political and 
I a philosophical appeal. In its purest theoretical sense, free trade is non-political. If 
carried to its full potential, many argue it would subordinate political considerations "toI 
the point ofnonexistence.,,25 In reality however, liberal trade policy has become a 
I hallmark of international political concern. The concept of complex interdependence is, 
I
 in the current international climate, inextricably linked to liberal trade notions.
 
Interdependence implies the existence of "situations characterized by reciprocal effects 
I among countries or among actors in different countries.,,26 In the years after World War 
I II, the number of international transactions, that is "flows of money, goods, people and 
I
 
20 Ibid.
 
21 Charles K. Rowley. et.a!. Trade Protection in the United States Aldershot, Edward EIg;u Publishers
 I Ltd. (1995) 31.
 
I 
22 Ibid.
 
13 Ibid. 32.
 
24 Ibid.
 
25 Crane 8.
 
'.
 
26 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye "Realism and Complex Interdependence" The Theoretical
 
Evolution ofInternational Political Economy ed. George Crane and Abla Amawi. Oxford University
 
Press: New York (1991) 123.
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I 
I messages across international boundaries" has increased radically.27 Although these 
phenomena certainly serve to increase the level of interconnectedness between countries, 
they do not necessarily equate interdependence. For genuine interdependence to occur, 
I 
I countries must share "reciprocal costly effects oftransactions.,,28 That is, the countries 
must rely on each other for necessary goods like oil rather than for luxury goods. 
Obviously, the more closely integrated two or more economies are, the more 
I sensitive each will be to changes in the others' policies. The Oil Shocks of the early 
I 1970's illustrated this point. The sudden increase in oil prices left the economies of 
Japan, Western Europe and the United States unprepared and vulnerable. 29 ThisI 
sensitivity also has become associated with a distinct political doctrine based on 
I harmonious relations between states.Jo Edmund Silberner argued in the nineteenth 
century that war is " ... the natural state of men ignorant of the laws of politicalI 
economy.,,31 The United States took on this view after the Second World War as it 
I established the existing liberal order. After two major world wars and a devastating 
I economic depression, U.S. policymakers were convinced that the only way to avoid 
I 
continued conflict was to reinforce the ties between states. Free trade is the natural 
I means to that end. It forces a focus on economic considerations like productivity. War 
undermines productivity by requiring abundant resources, thus peace is in the interest of 
all states.J2 
I 
I Philosophically, free trade is also appealing to the democratically-minded. As 
Krauss explains: 
I 21 Ibid.
 28 Ibid.
 
29 Ibid.
 
'0 Crane 8.
I 
I 8 
I 
• The conflict between the economic interests of specific groups within the community, and the economic interests of the community as a whole is the 
I essence of the free trade versus protectionism controversy. Free traders argue from the standpoint of the overall economy, protectionists argue 
from the standpoint of particular interest groupS.33 
I 
I Free trade is a theory designed to contribute to the betterment of the population as a 
whole. In the short term, it can be negative for those domestic residents who are 
associated with import competing firms. Typically however, ''the gainers... gain more 
I than the losers lose. ,,34 
I 
Arguments Against Free TradeI 
"Economists have long been frustrated by the discrepancy between the irrefutable 
I logic of the benefits of free trade in theory, and the persistence of protectionism in 
practice. ,,35 Objection to the tenets of free trade comes in a variety of forms and from a I 
variety of elements within society. This objection tends not only to refute the theories of 
I free trade, but also simultaneously to embrace. notions of protectionism. The most vocal 
I opponents tend quite naturally to be those most likely to be forced to withstand personal 
financial loss to assure its benefits to everyone else. As Vilfredo Pareto observed, 
I individuals are willing to work much harder to achieve a large gain than to avoid a small 
I loss. His reasoning is that "a protectionist measure provides large benefits to a small 
I
 
I
 31 Ibid.
 31 Ibid. 
I
 
33 Melvyn B. Krnuss. The New Protectionism: The Welfare State and International Trade New York
 
University Press, New York (1978). Cited by Peter Gray in Free Trade or Protection? (1985) 15-16.
 
34 John C. Whitehead "International Trade Benefits All Nations" Is Free Trade the Best Trading System?
 
ed. by David L. Bender. Greenhaven Press Inc. (1991) 36.
 
35 Gilbert R. Winharn The Evolution ofInternational Trade Agreements University of Toronto Press,
 I Toronto (1992) 34.
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I 
I number of people, and causes a very great number of consumers a smal1 loss, [which] 
makes it easier to put a protection measure into practice. ,,36 
In their philosophical discussion of the democratic aims of free trade, its 
I 
I supporters ignore the reality that special interest groups are a significant feature of 
democratic government. These groups are by nature, better organized, more efficient and 
more dedicated to achieving their policy goals than are the masses. They tend to receive 
I more attention from policymakers because:
 
I even when these concentrated interests are not well organized, legislators
 know that the affected publics are both more attentive to Washington 
action and more likely to show their appreciation at the polls than are I those citizens who have less at stake and who are less attentive to what happens in Congress. These simple arguments help to explain why 
Congress erects trade barriers to protect specific industries, creates an I endless stream of special tax provisions, maintains price supports for 
many agricultural commodities, and refuses to enact restrictions on the 
ownership of guns. 37I· 
I StereotypicalIy we think of opposition to free trade as coming predominantly 
I 
from organized labor groups and import-competing firms and industries. While that 
I certainly holds true, in recent years the voice of opposition has also spread to social, as 
opposed to purely economic groups. These groups are composed of members from many 
sections of society and their ideas tend to elicit a considered response from elected 
I.
 
I officials. In the case of organized labor, jobs and wages are, of course, always of prime
 
concern. The U.S. debate over the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
 
for example illustrates the typical breakdown of support for free trade initiatives. While 
I 
I support for the Agreement was extremely high among upper income and college­
educated Americans, "production and nonmanagerial workers" and Unions were 
I
 36 Vilfredo Pareto. Quoted in Winham's The Evolution ojlntemational Trade Agreements (1992) 34-5.
 
I 10 
I
 
I 
I steadfastly opposed]8 Their skepticism was fueled mainly by the fear that many 
American and multinational corporations currently located in the United States would 
close their U.S. operations and relocate to Mexico where they would be able to take 
I 
I advantage of the lower cost of labor there as well as more lax environmental, ethical and 
safety regulations]9 The result, they feared would be a net loss of blue collar and 
manufacturing jobs to Mexico as well as a decrease in wages in the United States. More 
I broadly, these critics maintained that the provisions of NAFTA failed to assure wage 
I growth in Mexico and as a result "Mexico's labor surplus, weak unions, and 
macroeconomic austerity will prevent wages from rising even as foreign investment I increases."4O The decreased cost of doing business, they argued would result not in a 
I reduction of prices for consumers but rather in higher profits for the large corporations. 
This situation defines a central objection to free trade: that is, that its benefits are seen I 
predominantly by those already at the top of the income distribution and their costs must 
I be borne disproportionately by those at the bottom. Free trade is thus, in the view of its 
I opponents, elitist and undemocratic. 
I 
Industry and import-competing firms have also advanced a number of arguments 
I against free trade, many of which are formed more as reasons that protection is necessary 
than as reasons for avoiding free trade. The infant-industry argument in favor of trade 
protection maintains "that temporary protection may be necessary to allow an industry to 
I reach maturity, to reap the full benefits of learning by doing, and thus to achieve its 
I 
I 37 Ibid. 38 Karen Roberts and Marl< Wilson. Policy Choices: Free Trode Among NAFTA Nations Michigan State 
University Press: East Lansing (1996) 38.
 
39 Ibid., 41.
 I 40 Ibid.
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I comparative advantage.''''' In its early stages, proponents say, an industry cannot be 
I expected to be able to compete with long-established foreign producers. The problem 
with this argument is that the supposed need for protection for the infant industry is based 
I on a time-related problem faced by all industries all of the time. With any capital 
I investment, "monies must be set aside now for revenues that will accrue in the future. ,,42 
Another dilemma is that protection of an unstable infant industry may promote
I investment that will only be lost once the industry is on its own. Similarly there is 
I generally a lack of compelling reason for supporting an infant industry when the good it 
offers is already being produced within the market. I Another popular justification for protection is the national defense argument 
I which maintains that a country should maintain its domestic productive capabilities in 
certain products - even though the logic of comparative advantage would suggest that the I 
product should be imported43 In the United States, steel is protected under this guise. 
I This creates problems for other domestic firms, like automobile producers, who are 
I unable to maximize their own competitiveness because they are forced to purchase steel 
at prices higher than those paid by foreign competitors.44 It would seem also (in some 
I cases at least) that a policy of stockpiling the good would be more economical than 
I producing it at a higher cost45 Related to this argument is the fact that protectionism is at 
I
 
I
 
I 
41 Rowley 50.
 
42 Ibid.
 
43 Ibid., 52.
 
44 EIIZO Grilli and Enrico Sassoon. The New Protectionist Wave New York: New York University Press
 
(1990) 3.
 I 45 Ibid., 51.
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I 
I times a form of foreign policy. Tariffs, credits, quotas, boycotts, embargoes, loans and 
currency manipulation are all "economic instruments of foreign policy.,,46 
The events of the 1980's brought about another argument against free trade. This 
I one advocated the abandonment of free trade principles in favor of strategic trade 
I policies. During this time changes occurred in the character of both the U.S. and world 
economies which made classical theory seem irrelevant. This fact, along with the rise of 
I oligopolies in new but vital technological industries led many to assert that the traditional 
.' 
view that "free trade is always the best policy" no longer held true. 47 Instead, it was 
argued that an activist trade policy, one that provided specific benefits to the mostI important sectors, would be more beneficial. A number of problems plague this theory as 
I well, however. Most basically, there is no set formula by which government can 
I accurately determine which sectors are "strategic." In that case the voices of special 
interests tend to be granted too much power and the result is an incoherent and inefficient 
I I· 48trade po ICy. 
I More recently, attention has turned to the "fair trade argument." The concept 
behind fair trade claims that trade policies should be harmonized such that trade takes 
I place between countries that are equally situated. The obvious problem here is that one 
I, of the major benefits to trade is diversity among nations. In large measure "international 
trade exists... because of differences in tastes and endowments between countries.''''9 
I Much of the argument is based in the U.S. on the idea that lower labor costs give foreign 
I 
I 
46 Senator John Heinz. U.S Strategic Trade: An Export Contral System for the i990 's Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press (1991) 3. 
47 Paul Krugman "New Thinking About Trade Policy" Strategic Trade Policy and the New intematianal 
Economics Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1988) 7. 
48 Rowley 63. I 49 Ibid. 
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I competitors an unfair advantage. 50 In reality, cheap labor does yield a comparative
 
I
 advantage in the production of labor-intensive commodities. Where labor is expensive,
 
on the other hand, a comparative advantage in capital intensive commodities tends to 
I exist. 51 
I A similar reason for opposing free trade of late is the phenomena of dumping. 
Essentially, the argument here is that unfair competition arises when foreign producers 
I sell their products at below-market prices52 Opponents of free trade argue that a tariff 
I must be levied to counteract this policy. This argument makes little sense however 
because in the long run, no firm can continue to sell its goods at prices that areI 
unprofitable. A tariff is thus an unnecessary measure in this case. 
,I The social-minded opponents of free trade (often referred to as "cosmopolitan" 
I opponents) tend to focus on slightly different aspects of the free trade debate. They argue 
that the past 200 years of international trade have increased the disparities in world living 
I standards. A study by Swiss economist Paul Bairoch contends that "per capita Gross 
I National Product in 1750 was approximately the same in the developed countries as in 
the undeveloped ones.,,53 In 1990 the ration was eight to one in favor of the developed. 
I A quote from James Roberson's book Future Wealth sums up this viewpoint: 
I The world has never had a genuinely free and fair trading system. Ever since people argued whether trade follows the flag or the flag follows 
trade, trade has been based on domination and dependency, and has been 
I an instrument of them. The ideology of free trade has been used, as ideologies often are, to justify the strong in taking advantage of the weak 
and to persuade the weak that it is neither conceptually respectable nor in 
I
 their own best long-term interest to protect themselves. 54
 
I
 
50 J. Bhagwali "Free Trade: Old and New Challenges" Economic Journal 104(3): (1994) 238.
 
51 Rowley 64.
 
" Ibid.. 65.
 
" David Morris. "Free Trade is Harmful" Is Free Trade the Best Trading System? ed. by David L. 
Bender. Greenhaven Press Inc. (1991) 26. I 54 Ibid., 27. 
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I
 
This argument centers primarily on income inequalities between countries of the North 
I 
I and of the South. Cosmopolitan opponents claim that the liberal economic order has 
resulted in the further impoverishment of citizens in Third World countries. Indeed there 
I 
is also concern that trade with the poor countries of the South has also led to a net 
decrease in wages and working conditions in the North55 These people claim that a 
I major goal of trade policy should be the improvement of living conditions worldwide and 
in particular the securing of decent wages and working conditions. I The notion that free trade itself is to blame for the inequality in worldwide wages 
I is not fully substantiated. Admittedly, the theory of free trade does not claim to make 
I possible a convergence of wages or standards of living between rich and poor. Rather, it 
promises to increase standards in both. 56 Furthermore, this argument ignores the 
I advances in technology that have come about during the past two centuries. Skilled labor 
I has always been associated with the accumulation of capital. As most skilled labor is 
located in the North and as the use of computers and other modem technology continues 
I 
I to displace unskilled labor, the income gap is likely to grow. 57 
Another objection motivated by social rather than economic considerations to 
arise in recent years is that free trade is harmful to the environment. Ralph Nader, the 
I 
I unofficial spokesperson for environmentalists opposed to free trade, and others have 
argued that free trade enables multinational corporations to more easily operate in regions 
of the world where environmental, health and safety standards are lax at best. Nader and 
I his backers fear that expanding free trade will result not only in a dramatic increase in 
I 
" Bhagwati 241.
 
56 Ibid.. 242.
I " Rowley 68.
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I 
I pollution in Third World countries, but that it will result also in a worldwide reduction of 
environmental regulations as industrialized countries fight to retain their industries. 58 
This argument has been perpetuated for some time now, but as yet there has been little 
I evidence to suggest a worldwide reduction in standards governing industry and 
I environment. 
Although there are easily identifiable problems associated with most of these 
I arguments against free trade, it is easy to see why they get so much attention. Most of 
I' these are highly salient issues to those affected. They are also issues that tend to elicit a 
powerful emotional response, even from those who are not directly influenced by theI 
outcome of the debate. It is not surprising, therefore that rational policymakers often find 
I it difficult to support free trade ideals. 
I Despite this, governments push on in their quest to extend the benefits of free 
trade. Change in this realm has come step-by-step, and always in the face of powerful 
I criticism. Although some worldwide trade agreements like the GATT have been 
I initiated, the drive for worldwide cooperation in reducing tariff barriers has been led by 
the creation of several formal trade agreements at the regional level. 
I 
I Regional Trade 
The trade regime envisioned by U.S. leaders in the aftermath of World War II was 
I 
I multilateral in nature. The GATT was created in that spirit in 1947. Its intention was to 
establish a free and open trading system that included many nations. 59 The basic 
I 58 Ralph Nader. "Introduction: Free Trade and the Decline of Democracy" The Case Against Free Trade 
San Francisco, CA: Earth Island Press (1993) 2. 
59 Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley The Growth o/Regional Trading Blocs in the Global I Economy Washington, DC: National Planning Association (1990) I. 
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I 
I principle behind the GATT was nondiscrimination. Any and all nations that were willing 
to abide by its rules were welcome to become members. Ultimately, the goal of GATT is 
"to build a unified and integrated global system" for the purpose of increasing trade, 
I prosperity and peace60 
I Although the GATT has continued to grow in both size and stature since its 
inception, another international trade trend has emerged with similar, though not identical 
I goals. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950's, the 
I notion of regional trade has stood as both a counter and a complement to the themes of 
multilateral trade. The most important question regarding the outgrowth of regional trade I 
arrangements is: what will the effect of these regional agreements be on multilateral 
I liberalization? 
I Two major views persist. The first and somewhat outdated view contends that 
because of their differing attitudes, regional trade blocs will be detrimental to continued 
I multilateral liberalization. Multilateral initiatives like the GATT and the International 
I Trade Organization were based on the principles of equality and nondiscrimination. This 
I 
system progressed through the 1950' and 1960's but began to slow down as did the world 
I economy in the 1970's. During the next decade, the growing realization that the United 
States could not on its own continue to hold up the GATT and hence the existing 
multilateral regime increased interest in regional trade blocs.61 
I 
I The primary difference between multilateral and regional trade in this view is that 
regional trade blocs necessarily follow a policy of discrimination. Whereas with the 
I
 
60 Ibid., x.
I 61 Ibid., 2.
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I 
I GATT members treat all other members as "most favored nations," members of regional 
trade blocs "share special preferences not granted to nations outside the bloc.,,62 
Proponents of this view also argue that while multilateral trade bases its 
I 
"economic view of the world on the efficacy of free trade and the concept of comparative 
I advantage, supporters of regional trade blocs, though not opposed to free trade, tend more 
towards an activist role for the goverrunent.',63 Regional trade involves greater use of 
I trade policy, investment strategy and government intervention designed to alter 
I comparative advantage. 
The major concern of those who feel that regional trade blocs are a threat to I 
multilateralism is the "them versus us" attitude that they argue defines regionalism. This 
I attitude contrasts with the more open and democratic spirit of a multilateral regime like 
that upheld by the GATT.64 I 
In contrast to that view is the notion that regional trade agreements are actually 
I building blocs to the larger goal of eventual multilateral cooperation. This argument has 
I gained in strength since the beginning of this decade. Proponents of regional trade 
arrangements typically include multinational corporations and large industries that stand 
I to gain from an increased market. Governments tend to favor regional trade 
arrangements because they stimulate growth and investment.65 The ever "increasing I 
number of new [regional trade1arrangements and the enlargement of the old ones has 
I shown... that this form of organization could be considered an intermediate step towards 
I 
62 Ibid., 4. 
I 63 Ibid.
 64 Ibid.
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I 
I multilateral liberalization.'.66 The economic behavior of the largest and best established 
of the trade blocs in that time demonstrated openness in relation to other parts of the 
world.67 When the European Community was formalized into a Union early in the 
I 
I decade, many expressed the fear that it would become a "Fortress Europe" and would no 
longer have a need or an incentive to continue trading with the rest of the world 68 It has 
proven thus far however, that despite the elimination of trade barriers within its walls, it 
I is still willing to do business with non-members. 
I Not only have regional trade arrangements proven merely compatible with 
multilateral liberalization, they in fact "have had a positive overall impact onI international trade and the multilateral trading system. ,,69 Internal adjustments within the 
I trade blocs have actually seemed to make the member economies more competitive and 
I better prepared to accept both the economic and political aspects of multilateral 
l·b I· . 70I era IzatlOn. In addition regional trade blocs have served as "test beds" for 
I "techniques which have subsequently found application in the multilateral trading 
I system.,,71 
I 
Regardless of the effect of regionalism on multilateralism, its appeal is certainly 
I growing worldwide. By the 1980's, a number of important preferential trade agreements 
were underway. During that time, the European Community continued to integrate more 
I 66 Vera Thortensen. "Connections and inlerlinkages Between Regional integration Arrangements and the 
I
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I 
I closely. Canada and the United States signed a new free trade agreement and in South 
America, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay joined together in MERCOSUR72 By 1995, the 
European Union was a formal entity, Mexico had joined together with Canada and the 
I United States to form the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the World Trade 
I Organization have received notification of over ninety new preferential trade 
agreements. 73 
I Of all the existing trade blocs, the European Union is of course the oldest and the 
I most advanced. The European Community was first established in 1958 and has since 
grown into the most tightly integrated economic area in the world. With the signing ofI 
the Maastricht Treaty on November I, 1993, the EC became officially a "Union" and a 
I single market providing for the free movement of people, capital, and goods and services. 
I At the same time Maastricht prepared the way for greater political and economic 
integration with its plans for the creation of a European Monetary Union (EMU) and a 
I single currency before 2000. 
I Even before Maastricht, pressure was mounting for other regions to take more 
I 
formal steps toward integration. In Asia, ASEAN, which was originally created in 1967, 
I began working "to enhance its effectiveness in economic cooperation.,,74 The North 
American response to the challenge of the EU was the creation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
I
 
I
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I WhyNAFfA? 
I The North American Free Trade Agreement came about as the next logical "step 
in a gradual process of economic integration that has been under way implicitly in North 
I America for quite some time.,,7s In 1965, Canada and the United States formed the
 
I
 Canada - U.S. Auto Pact. Two decades later that pact was expanded into the Canada­

U.S. Free Trade Agreement76 Between 1985 and 1989, the U.S. also signed a number of 
I trade agreements with Mexico designed to help reform the Mexican economy and bring it 
I more "up to speed" with its developed neighbors to the North.
 
In the early years of this decade the leaders of all three countries were
I 
undoubtedly urged on by events in Europe. Integration of the three economies promised 
I to yield a market as large and populous as that of the European Union. 77 The lure of a 
North American economic alliance was I 
Not that it would greatly embellish the existing trade bloc known as the 
I United States, but rather that it holds open the prospect for substantial synergy among the three economies that could generate important income 
and employment gains and enhance the international competitiveness of 
firms throughout the region. 78I 
Similarly at the time all three countries were faced with large foreign debts and thus the 
I "need to improve the efficiency and productivity of their labor forces and industries to 
I compete more effectively against foreign suppliers in markets at home and abroad.,,79 
I
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I
 
I What is NAFfA?
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement which went into effect on January 1,
 
1994 was the result of years of debate and discussion between and within its member 
I states: Canada, Mexico and the United States. The Agreement created a market with total 
I production (GNP) of nearly $60 trillion, total population of357 million and total trade of 
$1.4 trillion. so This market was larger than its closest competitor at the time, the I European Community (EC). Combined with the then European Free Trade Association 
I (EFTA), the EC had "a combined GNP of$5,784 billion and a population of358 
million."slI 
Dominated by the U.S. economy, which accounts for over 85 percent of 
I NAFTA's output and 70 percent of its population, NAFTA improves prospects for 
I cooperation among its three member states "that could generate important income and 
employment gains and enhance the international competitiveness of firms throughout the 
I 
I region."s2 NAFTA sets the ground rules that the already underway process of cross­
border trade liberalization should follow. In a nutshell, it stipulates that virtually all 
restrictions on manufacturing trade be eliminated within 10 years. Regulations on 
I 
I agricultural goods are to be removed within IS years. 83 In addition to manufactured and 
agricultural goods, NAFTA discusses intellectual property, investments and services like 
banking, insurance and shipping and "parallel agreements authorized the imposition of 
I
 
I
 
I 
79 Ibid.
 
80 Ibid. 4.
 
81 Hufbauer 4.
 
82 Ibid.
 
83 William A Orrne, Jr. Understanding NAFfA: Mexico, Free Trade and the New North America
 I University of Texas Press: Austin (1996) 1.
 
I 22 
I 
I trade sanctions to provide additional protection to workers and the environmentM It's 
I
 goals and objectives are clearly defined in Chapter I, Article 102:
 
The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through
 
I its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation
 treatment and transparency are to:
 
(a.) Eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border movement
 
I of goods and services between the territories of the parties:
 (b.) Promote conditions offair competition in the free trade area:
 
(c.) Increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories;
 
I (d.) Provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property
 
I 
rights in each Party's territory; 
(e.) Create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement, and for its joint administration and the resolution of disputes: and 
(f)	 Establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to 
expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement." 
I The achievement of this agreement and then its subsequent ratification in each of the 
I three member nations did not come easy. The vastly different economic situations in the 
U.S. and Canada and Mexico created a unique negotiating situation. Each partner came 
I to the table with a list of criteria and objectives it wanted to ensure would be met. Each 
I
 also faced severe opposition from various groups within its own population.
 
The differing perspectives on NAFTA among its three members are important. 
I The objectives sought and the obstacles that had to be overcome by each state were 
I influential to the outcome of the agreement and have the potential to color its future as 
well as the future of later trade arrangements. 
I	 Mexico 
I	 Although the official origins ofNAFTA are questionable, it seems certain that the 
individual most committed to turning the concept into a reality was Mexican President 
I Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Beginning with the signing of the Brady Plan, the pact which 
I 
I
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I 
I reduced payments of Mexico's $48 billion foreign debt in February, 1990; Salinas 
embarked upon a mission to attract foreign investment into his country's economy. His 
approach was twofold. Salinas committed himself first to "the privatization of Mexico's 
I banks" and second, to "the pursuit of a free trade pact with Washington.,,86 
I Privatization turned out to be highly successful. The Salinas Administration 
eventually sold 18 banks for more than three times book value. In addition, the prospect I 
I 
ofNAFTA "drove up the market value of state airlines, steel mills, fertilizer factories" 
and many other properties. 87 By mid-1992, aided by the potential for NAFTA, Salinas 
managed to take in $19.5 billion from privatization sales.88 The pursuit of a free trade I 
agreement with the U.S. however proved to be more difficult. Among his own people, a 
I century and a half of pent-up anger toward the U.S. for its annexation of Texas in 1821 
I and its "purchase" of California and New Mexico in 1845 revealed itself in the form of 
extreme mistrust of U. S. goals. In the eyes of most Mexicans, their country's relationship 
I 
I to its Northern neighbor is one shaped by "armed conflict, military invasion, and 
economic and cultural penetration.,,89 Salinas' efforts to negotiate a free trade deal with 
the U.S. were thus not only hampered by economic concerns, they were also politically 
I
 
I risky.
 
Despite these obstacles, Salinas managed to mobilize support for the initiative.
 
One important factor was the existing interdependence between Mexico and the United 
I 
I States. This interdependence was most obviously manifested in the Maquiladora 
agreement, border crossings and population settlements along both sides of the border. 
I 86 William A Orme, Jr. Continental Shift: Free Trade and the New North America Washington, DC, The Washington Post Company (1993) 22. 
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I 
I Maquiladoras, or in-bond plants, were created by a 1965 agreement between the two 
countries. Intended to solve the problem of Mexican migrant workers refusing to return 
home after working in the U. S. and opting instead to remain in the border towns with the 
I hope of finding an opportunity to cross back into the U.S., the National Border Program 
I as it was called in Mexico (Border Industrialization Program in the U.S.) declared that 
"U.S. companies that wanted to locate plants on the Mexican side of the border would 
I receive preferential tax treatment of the goods they produced there.,,9o Under the U.S. 
I Tariff Schedule Code, these plants were subject to tariffs only on the value added to the 
good during manufacturing. Between 1975-1985, "the share of Mexican employment in I 
the maquiladoras more than doubled, rising from 1.84 percent to 4 percent" and by 1990 
I 
I nearly half a million people were employed by maquiladoras. 9/ These companies were 
successful not only in providing jobs, they also proved to be "the most stable economic 
sector and the leaders in Mexican exports and growth" during the Mexican economic 
I crisis ofl995n 
I Border crossings between the two countries are another sign of increasing 
interdependence. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service reports that in 1988, 
I 
I 226 million people, 60 percent of whom were non-U.S. citizens, crossed the border 
legally. In 1989, over 60 million "crossed at just one point of entry, between Tijuana and 
San Diego.,,93 These numbers illustrate the magnitude of interaction between Mexico 
I and the U.S. They also reflect the immense population growth along both sides ofthe 
I .9 Robert T. Moran. NAFTA: Managing the Cultural Differences Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Company 
(1994) 30. 
I 90 Manuel Chavez and Scott Whiteford. "Beyond the Market: Political and Socioeconomic Dimensions of NAFTA for Mexico" in Policy Choices: Free Trade Among NAFTA Nations ed. by Karen Roberts and 
I
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I 
I border. From 1970 to 1990, population in the northern Mexican states and in the 
Southwestern U. S. rose from 42 million to nearly 63 million people. This area consists of 
"roughly one-fifth of the two countries' total populations."94 The quantities of people
I living in this region "puts pressure on services, the environment, natural resources, 
I infrastructure, employment, and political systems and adds to the development problems 
being addressed" by both Mexico and the United States95 I From a Mexican perspective, therefore, NAFTA can be considered a 
I formalization ofprocesses that have long been underway. Why then, was there a need 
for the agreement? Mexico's initial objectives in the NAFTA were thus relatively clear. I 
First and foremost, a free trade agreement with the U.S. would secure open access to the 
I American market. 
I In addition to the interdependence created by these three factors, Mexico relies on 
the U. S. market for approximately 75 percent of its total trade. Exports to the U. S. 
I 
I constitute 13 percent ofMexican GNP and recent alterations in the composition of 
Mexican exports, namely the "sharp growth in manufactures exports and a sharp drop in 
the share accounted for by oil" has increased Mexican dependence on U.S. consumers% 
I 
I The free trade agreement was a way to ensure that protectionism by the U.S. would not 
hinder Mexican exports. Although to date, protectionism has not been much of an 
obstacle, it was feared that "the continued growth ofMexican non-oil exports to the 
I United States could generate pressures for new U.S. trade controls.,,97 
I 
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I 
I Mexico's second incentive was that the NAFTA promised to spur 
domestic reform efforts which were already underway98 In addition to the privatization 
and deregulation of key sectors undertaken by Salinas, "regulations regarding foreign 
I investment and technology transfer have been liberalized and the intellectual property 
I laws substantially revamped.,,99 Mexico's record of sharp currency devaluations and 
fiscal difficulties as well as its history of "erratic policy swings and property seizures" 
I have for years given it a bad name among investorslOO The peso crisis, which erupted in 
I 1995, had been predicted during the NAFTA negotiations. By securing international 
commitments to expanding Mexico's domestic economic reforms however, the NAFTA I 
was meant to signify that this was a new Mexico and that its "favorable climate toward 
I trade and investment" would not be easily reversed. 101 
I Future Mexican economic development, as Salinas realized, is dependent on 
increased foreign investment, repatriation of blight capital and loans from international 
I· financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. 102 By making the Mexican 
I economy a part of the largest market in the world, NAFTA improves its prospects for all 
three of these objectives. 
I 
I Canada 
Canada was not nearly so receptive to the idea of a continental free trade 
I 
I arrangement as Mexico. In March 1990 when then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was 
alerted to the possibility of a U.S. Mexican trade accord, he was the most unpopular 
I 98 Ibid, 12.
 99 Ibid
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I leader in Canada's 50 year polling history.103 The free trade agreement he had negotiated 
I with the United States was being blamed for the recession that had struck Canada the 
previous year. As a result, many Canadians were outraged at the prospect of a broader I agreement, especially one that included Mexico which accounts for merely .4 percent of 
I Canada's total exports and 1.3 percent of its importslO4 
The issue of sovereignty was raised frequently during the NAFTA debate in I Canada. Mulroney explains this viewpoint in a speech regarding the CFTA. "Canadians 
I derive many benefits from their proximity to the U. S., but they have to pay a price for it 
too. How high a price remains negotiable, but economic, cultural and political I 
sovereignty must be protected constantly or else be lost.,,105 Of these concerns the 
I primary one was economic. Canadian policymakers and citizens were concerned that 
I free trade with the U.S. and Mexico would require to some extent, a restructuring of the 
Canadian economy. Their fear was that such a restructuring would have negative 
I implications for many popular but expensive public programs. 106 Their rationale was that 
I while the NAFTA did not insist on the convergence of national policies, a free trade 
agreement would produce new competitors within the region, thus increasing pressure 
I toward eventual convergence.,,107 Similarly, many feared that if Canada were to continue 
I to run large fiscal deficits and "control inflation through tight monetary policy" it would 
I
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I face both high interest rates and a strong exchange rate, policies which would put 
I, Canadian firms at a distinct competitive disadvantage. 108 
,I Why then did Canada choose to accept such an agreement? A major reason was 
its desire to avoid missing the boat. Canada has always maintained a powerful role in 
I international negotiations, far more powerful than its economic position merits. Staying 
out of the NAFTA, some feared, would reduce Canada's claim to be one of the "Big I Four" in trade negotiations (along with the U.S., the European Union and Japan). 109 
I Likewise, Canadian policymakers wanted to avoid a relative reduction of its 
Ii current FTA benefits in the U.S. market. To a much lesser degree, they wanted to ensure that Canadian access to Mexico's market was comparable to that allowed its American 
I, competitors. 110 Like the United States, Canada was concerned with increasing
 
I
 competition from Japan and Europe as well as new competition from the "Asian Tigers,"
 
and other newly industrialized countries like India and Brazil. III The NAFTA would 
I force Canadians to "either continue to recover. their competitiveness relative to their 
I trading partners or forfeit their standard ofliving."ll2 
I The United States 
I As by far the largest and most powerful of the three economies joined by the 
NAFTA, the United States plays a unique role. As in Canada, public opinion in the U. S. 
I mounted quickly against the trade deal. Although negotiations for the NAFTA began 
I 108 Ibid.
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'1 
I under President Bush, the topic did not turn into a real media frenzy until the 1992 
I presidential campaign. Poll after poll taken during the election year revealed that a 
,I majority of Americans felt insecure about the economic future of the nation. l13 Concern 
over the economy came from many places. Talk of the massive federal deficit, increasing 
I unemployment and the decline in U.S. competitiveness overseas dominated news 
headlines. It was largely in response to that insecurity that billionaire Texan H. RossI Perot managed to step into the Presidential limelight and become the most successful 
I third party candidate since Teddy Roosevelt in 1912 .114 While both President Bush and 
I his Democratic challenger Bill Clinton supported the NAFTA, Perot based his campaign 
on attacking the agreement. He became the voice of myriad groups who opposed the 
I NAFTA. Perot summed up most of the U.S. argument against NAFTA in a June 1992 
I interview in New Republic: 
I 
I 
.. .I am not a protectionist, but pragmatically as a guy who understands 
business, if! can build a factory in Mexico, pay my labor a dollar an hour, 
hire a 25-year-old work force, have little or no health care, little or no 
retirement, have no pollution or environmental controls, then if you are the 
greatest businessman in the world, if you are Einstein in business trying to 
I, 
compete with me in the United States, you can't even get into the ring 
with those numbers. 115 
Perot's message appealed to a surprising number of Americans. In a July 5-7 Wall Street 
I Journal/NBC News Poll, Perot (33 percent) led both Bush (3 I percent) and Clinton (28 
percent). Thirty-seven percent of the respondents declared him the candidate "most able 
I to deal with the economy" compared to Bush and Clinton, each with 16 percent116 
I 
I, 113 Grayson 109. 
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I Although it is unlikely that Perot was ever really a "serious candidate" for 
I President, the chord he struck among much of the population had definitely altered the 
political ease with which the agreement could be passed, In the end, of course, Clinton 
I won the election and the NAFTA negotiations commenced soon after he took office, 
I' Despite the cries of the opposition, the United States had several important 
objectives in pursuing the NAFTA. In the broadest sense, "the United States has a strong I and abiding interest in promoting economic growth, political stability, and progress 
toward greater democracy in Mexico,,,!!7 If able to achieve these goals a FTA would I', 
II obviously be a benefit to the U.S, in that it would reduce the risk of instability along its 
southern border. Typical forecasts during the negotiations showed 500 jobs would be 
,I created in Mexico for every 100 jobs created in the U.S. This is due quite naturally to the 
I'
 difference in growth potential of an industrial superpower and a poor developing
 
nation,I!8 The potential for improvement in the Mexican economy is immense, As 
I William Orme explains: 
'I NAFTA accelerates a liberalization trend that has already tripled bilateral trade and could soon propel Mexico past Japan as the second biggest 
market for American goods. Within a decade, at present growth rates, 
l Mexico could be buying as much from the United States as Canada does today. If, prodded by NAFTA, the Mexican economy expands at the 
faster annual rate of 6 percent. . .it could surpass Canada as an American 
I market early in the next century. At that pace, within 20 years Northern Mexico could expect to enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of 
the contiguous American Southwest today, 119 
I More specifically the U.S. was interested in the expansion of trade with Mexico,
 
I, already its third largest trading partner. In response to the many environmentalists who
 
I,
 opposed NAFTA on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the earth, air and water
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I 
I along the Mexican border and eventually around the world; U.S. negotiators worked also 
to ensure that the agreement would "promote the efficient use of natural and human 
resources in the North American region."[20 At the same time, U.S. firms would stand to 
·11 gain new opportunities assuming the NAFTA could spur Mexican reforms in trade, 
I' investment and intellectual property rights. l2l Theoretically, the stimulation of economic 
,I growth in Mexico would increase demand there for American goods and services. This 
would in turn increase employment opportunities in the U.S. In addition, the growth 
I experienced by the Mexican economy would create more jobs and better wages which 
II would thus reduce incentives for Mexican citizens to migrate illegally into the United States. 122 
,II 
I NAFfA and Agriculture 
Although the original goal of the NAFTA was to end all tariff and nontariff 
'I 
I barriers to trade, it quickly became apparent that a gradual phasing out of trade 
restrictions in key economic sectors would be necessary to allow these sectors to prepare 
for increased competition. As a highly sensitive sector in all three countries, agriculture 
I 
I was treated with extreme care. NAFTA has a number of special safeguards that can 
come into effect "ifan industry is determined to be injured through the liberalization 
process. ,,[23 
I 
J NAFTA's chapter on agriculture is divided into three separate bilateral 
agreements, Canadian-U.S. trade is still governed by the pre-existing Canada-U.S. free 
I
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f 
I trade agreement. From a U.S. perspective, therefore, the most significant changes to 
result from NAFTA have been on the Mexican side. The agricultural trade relationship 
between the U.S. and Mexico is unique as it links two vastly different agricultural 
,I, 
systems in a mutually beneficial arrangement.
 
I' In the last ten years, Mexico and the U.S. have engaged in a mutual process of
 
,I
 reducing tariffs on agricultural goods and eliminating nontariff barriers to trade. NAFTA
 
promised to eliminate all trade barriers "by converting nontariff barriers between the
 
I United States and Mexico to 'tariff-rate quotas' (TRQ) or ordinary tariffs, and then
 
I,
 phasing out to zero all tariffs...over periods ofup to 15 years. ,,124
 
During the past decade, the U.S. has achieved a net surplus in agricultural trade. 
I Mexico is the fastest-growing export market for U.S. agricultural goods. From 1986 to 
I
 1992, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico have tripled. 125 Canada ranks a close second.
 
In the past 5 years Mexico has imported, on average, $3.6 billion in U.S. agricultural 
'I 
I, goods. 126 Mexican agricultural imports to the United States have grown also, though 
much more slowly. Principal U.S. exports to Mexico include "feed grains, oilseeds, live 
animals, meat and dairy products" while Mexican exports to the U. S. are dominated by 
I 
J "coffee, fruits and vegetables and live animals. ,,127 U.S. exports to Canada consisted 
primarily of vegetables, live animals and meats and grains. 128 
I,
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I 
I· NAFTA's chapter on agriculture is divided into three separate bilateral 
'I agreements. Canadian - U.S. agricultural trade is still governed by the pre-existing 
Canada Free Trade Agreement. It establishes provisions for dealing with (1) tariff and 
J 
I nontarifftrade barriers, (2) safeguard measures, (3) domestic supports, (4) export 
subsidies, (5) rules of origin, (6) commercial dispute settlement, (7) sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards and (8) investment opportunities. 129 A joint committee on 
'I 
I' agricultural trade was established to monitor the execution of these provisions. 
According to the U. S. - Mexican bilateral agreement, all agricultural tariffs will 
II be eliminated within a fifteen year transition period. Average U.S. agricultural tariffs are 
about 4 Y, percent and eliminating them will not result in substantial effects. An 
.' 
exception to this is the case of meat. Under the Meat Import Act of 1979, Mexican 
exports offresh, chilled or frozen meat to the U.S. are Iimited. 130 Nontarifftrade barriers I 
were set to be revoked immediately or converted to the TRQ system which 
I 
,I, permits NAFTA partners to export a specified 'in-quota' quantity to the 
other partners at a tariff rate lower than the pre-NAFTA amount. All 
additional exports above the in-quota volume will be assessed a higher 
'over-quota' tariff. The in-quota volume will increase by 3 percent 
annually, and the over-quota volume will be phased out by the end of the 
,.
 . . . d 131
transItIon peno . 
NAFTA's agricultural safeguard provisions provide for the suspension of further 
I, 
'I tariff reductions for a period of up to four years, "reestablishment of a rate not more than 
the MFN rate, and compensation to trading partners.,,132 The NAFTA safeguard 
provisions are triggered on the basis of import volume, unlike the CFTA snapback 
I mechanisms which are triggered by import price. 
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If 
I, 
'I 
NAFTA allows its members to retain domestic support programs due to their 
importance for agriculture in all three countries, The agreement does however encourage 
the adoption ofprices which are "not trade distorting, ,,133 NAFTA promotes the 
I elimination of export subsidies but allows its members to "match export subsidies offered 
J by countries outside" the agreement. 134 
In an effort "to prevent third countries from using Mexico as an export platform to I' gain duty-free access to the U.S. market," U.S, negotiators insisted on rules of origin
 
I provisions that specified content requirements for products traded under NAFTA,m
 
I,
 Also under NAFTA, each country maintains its right to develop and enforce
 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures designed to protect life and health from risks created 
I 
I, by pests, diseases or contaminants, It does urge its members to conform to international 
SPS standards, These regulations, however "may exceed international standards if they 
are based on scientific evidence and are applied to both domestic and imported 
,I, products,,,136 
'1 Finally, NAFTA eliminates investment barriers in agriculture in the U.S, Canada 
and Mexico, In particular, NAFTA makes investing in Mexico easier by reducing 
I, Mexican requirements for government approval of new investments and by giving 
I American and Canadian investors rights to repatriate profits and capital flows in hard 
currency, 137 
I: 
J 
132 Zangari 47.
 
133 Ibid.
 
134 Schweikhardt and Yurnkella 69.
 
t
 135 Zangari 48,
 
I, 35 
I 
f,
 
I,
 The Structure of Mexican Agriculture 
I Mexico's agricultural system has undergone vast changes since the NAFTA 
wheels really began turning in the early part of the decade. Along with his reforms in 
I banking and commerce, President Salinas initiated a land reform program with the intent 
I of modernizing his country's traditional farming sector. The ejida system he replaced 
was a collection of laws dating as far back as 1917, It was devised at that time "to reduce 
I the power of pre - revolutionary landowning families by redistributing their huge 
If 
, holdings to the peasantry while ensuring that peasants retained their land. 138 Under this 
system, the state controlled ejida plots and allowed peasants to use them. The plots could 
not be purchased, sold, rented, or used as collateral. Ofthose eligible, slightly over half 
I 
I, eventually received their land. 139 The Mexican government closely regulated land 
ownership outside the ejida structure as well. Individuals could not own more than 100 
hectares of irrigated farmland and corporations were unable to own land at all. 140 
I Because ejidatarias were unable either to sell or improve upon their land and 
I because Mexican ownership laws prevented the development oflarger, more efficient 
farms, Mexican agriculture remained, to a large extent, at the subsistence level. In an 
I 
I effort to restructure the ejida system along lines more conducive to the goals of a free 
market economy, Salinas "ended the land distribution program and opened the way for 
ejida privatization."141 Under his program, ejidatarias were given titles to their lands II however individuals were still prevented from owning more than 100 hectares. 
I 136 Ibid 
137 Zangari 49. 
I 138 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart? ITE-545 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1992) 200. IS9 Ibid
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'I 
I Foreigners were granted the same land ownership rights as Mexican citizens and both 
domestic and foreign corporations were allowed to own up to 2500 hectares (about 6200 
acres). 142 
I These reforms, along with a steady reduction in agricultural subsidies, were 
I necessary for making "Mexican agriculture more efficient and competitive and less 
dependent on state support,,143 Although some displacement of small farmers has 
I 
occurred (as in Chiapas where a peasant uprising brought the Mexican agricultural 
I situation to the international stage) the reforms were vital to the development of a modern 
farming sectoL I· Even as Salina's reforms were being put into effect, the modern Mexican 
I agricultural sector was already growing and integrating itself into the North American 
I market. Driven by the desire to export and the need to feed its rapidly expanding 
population, Mexico is dependent on U.S. know-how, US. machinery and U.S. capital. 144 
I Still, Mexico's commercial farming sector lags far behind that of its northern neighboL 
I Part of the problem is that despite efforts by the Mexican government to increase 
I 
productivity by modernizing the traditional farming sector, the country is faced with 
I limited water supplies and arable land. Only 12 percent of Mexico's land (67 million 
acres) is arable compared with 464 million arable acres in the United States. Of the 
approximately 30 million acres that could be irrigated, 60 percent continues to be 
I rainfed. 145 Both Mexican and USDA officials estimate that Mexico is operating near its 
.'

.' 14\ Tom Barry. Zapata's Revenge: Free Trade and the Farm Crisis in Mexico South End Press: Boston,
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t, 
maximum productivity level in agriculture. l46 As a result, Mexico relies heavily on the 
'I
 u.s. both as a market for its exports ani! as a source for needed imports.
 
Mexican agricultural output is dominated by crop production which accounts for 
I S8 percent of total output in 1992. 147 Livestock, which accounts for 33 percent of 
I agricultural output is its second largest commodity, followed by forestry, fishing and 
hunting which together total the remaining nine percent. Altogether, agriculture makes I up about nine percent ofMexico's gross domestic product (GDP).148 Of this nine 
'I percent, the modern farming sector produces roughly three-fourths of total output. The 
I,
 remainder continues to be produced by the traditional sector which still constitutes over
 
half of the agricultural labor force. 149 
I Mexico has historically been a closed, state-controlled economy. ISO In the past it 
I has relied on tariffs as high as 100 percent and an array of non-tariff barriers "including 
domestic content requirements, restrictions on investment, performance requirements to 
I keep out exports, and import-licensing requirements.,,)SI By the mid 1980's, it was clear 
t to the Mexican government that these policies, like the ejido system, did not help the 
majority of their people but rather contributed to widespread poverty. From 1987 to 
I 
I 1992, the Mexican government began systematically reducing its trade and investment 
barriers. ls2 While these policies resulted in a net increase in imports, they also forced 
improvements in Mexican firms'competitiveness. 
I 
I,
 146 zangari 45.
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I Mexican Beef Cattle Industry 
An industry in which a network of non-tariff barriers was retained however, is 
I· beef Even during the NAFTA negotiations, the Mexican government was attempting to 
I place new restrictions on American beef imports. That year, a ban on all U. S. boxed beef 
was announced by the Mexican state ofNuevo Leon, the goal of which was to force U.S. 
recognition ofNuevo Leon grading standards. m Although this ban was ultimately 
I avoided, Mexico did demand that "frozen boxed beef, which constitutes the majority of 
I,
 [U.S.] beef exports, ...be held along the border until a sample is taken from every truck
 
and transported by a Mexican inspector into Mexico for inspection. The sample is then 
• 
I ... defrosted and inspected for gross contaminationl54 The effect of this procedure is to 
prevent truckloads of U.S. beef from arriving at their destinations on time. On June 16 of 
the same year, the Mexican government announced that it would no longer allow 
I 
I American beef, pork, lamb or poultry to enter.Mexico unless it came from a Mexican 
accredited establishment. ISS 
The domestic industry that the Mexican government was attempting to protect is 
I 
I small when compared with the huge beef cattle industry of the United States. In the early 
1980's, fully 86 percent of the land under agricultural exploitation in Mexico was 
devoted to cattle ranching. In 1995, Mexico's herd accounted for four percent of world 
I beef production while the U.S. share was 25 percent I56 While areas of Mexico like the 
I 153 U.S. House of Representatives. Hearing before Committee on Agriculture. "Review ofissues Related 
to the North American Free-Trade Agreement - NAFTA" 102-70.8 April, 9 July, 16,23,30 September 
1992: 232. 
" 
154 Ibid.. 233. 
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t. hltp://mnl'.bccforgilibrrcflbccOlandlccon 1.l1u11l# 1 4 March 1998. 
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t wet, southern region of Huasteca provide outstanding ranching opportunities, the industry 
suffers from Mexico's inability to produce enough grain to feed more cattle. 157 In 
addition, the cost of importing grain approximately offsets "Mexico's labor cost 
I 
I advantages for feeding and slaughtering cattle.,,158 Even if improvements were made in 
Mexico's transportation system, costs would decrease only slightly below those in the 
;1 U.S. Since "there is substantial U.S. overcapacity, and per capita beef consumption is 
decreasing, neither feeders nor packers have much reason to contemplate investments in 
I Mexico.,,159 As a result, there is limited potential for growth in the Mexican industry. 
Mexican trade barriers on beef do little to further domestic sales because virtually I all of the country's beef products are already sold within the home market. Mexican 
I ranchers do "ship feeder cattle to U.S. producers for fattening and slaughter.,,16o They 
also purchase semen and breeding stock from their American counterparts. I 
Mexico also lacks cost advantages in the production, slaughter and packing of 
I beef. As a result, it imports $472 million in U.S. beef, making it the third largest export 
market for American red meats. 161 The majority of this beef goes to feed tourists and I 
wealthy consumers, as over half ofMexico's population is unable to afford the product. 
I 
I Structure of U.S. Agriculture 
Once a highly labor intensive sector, which provided low incomes to most 
I workers, American agriculture has in recent decades been transformed into "a highly 
'I 
I 
157 Frans 1. Schryer. Ethniciy and Class Conflict in Rural Mexico Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ 
(1990) 152. 
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I capital intensive sector capable of providing incomes comparable to other sectors.,,162 
I Historically, the classic American values of individualism and independence from 
government interference kept U.S. farmers and the government from developing a close 
I
 
I relationship. With the exception ofthe Homestead Act of 1862 which provided
 
inexpensive land to would-be settlers, farmers paid little attention to the agricultural
 
I,
 legislation of the nineteenth century. 163 It wasn't until the Great Depression of the 1930s
 
that farmers seriously began pushing the government for assistance. By this time,
 
I American farming had grown relatively commercialized and market dependent .164 To
 
cope with the disaster, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment ACTS (AAA) of
I 1933 and 1938. These measures created price supports which were enforced by supply 
I controls like acreage allotments. With the passage of these acts, the United States 
forfeited its export markets for price supported commodities.,,16l In the environment ofI 
the Great Depression, such actions seemed fair and reasonable, particularly since 
I economists of the day argued "that fundamental economic forces chronically 
I disadvantage agriculture in the market relative to the nonagricultural sectors.,,166 In 
addition, it was believed that agricultural markets were at a much greater risk of 
I instability than nonagricultural markets. As a result, farm families were perceived as 
I generally poorer than nonfarm families and societal pressure mounted in favor of aid. 167 
While popular perception remains affected by these views, the reality is that on 
I average, U.S. farmers of all sizes earn at least as much net income as those in other 
I 162 Natianal Palicies andAgricultural Trade: Cauntry Study United States OECD: Paris (1987) 13. 
163 James T. Bonnen "Institutions, Instruments, and Driving forces Behind U.S. National Agricultural 
Policies" u.S.-Canadian Agricultural trade Challenges: Develaping Common Approaches 00. by KristenI Allen and Katie Macmillan. Resources for the Future: Washington, DC (1988) 23. 164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid.,24. 
I
 166 Ibid., 26.
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I 
I sectors. '68 In addition, increasing efficiency in recent years has allowed agriculture to 
integrate itself into the general economy "through its input purchases, its participation in 
credit and capital markets and through the evolution of a more sophisticated agro-food I system adding value at diverse points throughout the chain.,,169 
I Despite changes in the system, U.S. agriculture is still dominated by the family 
farm. According to the 1992 U.S. Census of Agriculture, only 3.6 percent of US. farmsI are owned by corporations. Most of these are themselves family owned with fewer than 
I ten stockholders. Only 0.4 percent ofUS. farms are non-family corporations. '7o (See 
chart.)17l
I 
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The US. agricultural structure is unique in that less than two percent of the U.S. 
I population is involved in farming, but US. agriculture produces enough to feed the 
I 
t 167 Ibid.
 168 Ibid., 37.
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I 
I nation as well as 70 million people around the world. 172 American farmers are the most 
productive in the world. Today on average, each US. farmer produces enough food and 
fiber to supply 129 persons. Despite the relatively small number of people directly 
I involved in farming, agriculture remains "the largest segment of the U.S. economy, with
 
I sales of$174.4 billion in 1993.,,173
 
I,
 The geographical diversity enjoyed by American agriculture is such that a wide
 
range of crops and livestock and livestock products are produced. 174 While sales of
 
I livestock and livestock products have declined in recent years, beef and veal remains the
 
single most important US. agricultural commodity.
 I 
I u.s. Beef Cattle Industry 
I As the largest sector of the largest sector of the American economy, the concerns 
of the beef industry are of considerable importance. Unlike most agricultural products in 
I 
I the U.S., cattle and beef production operates within the free market. Prices are set by 
supply and demand and the federal government does not sponsor price support programs 
for beef 175 The structure ofUS. "beef production involves two major groups of 
I 
I livestock producers, cow-calf operators and feedlot operators,,176 Cow-calf operators 
maintain the herds and raise calves. They also decide how many cows to breed and at 
what time calves should be sold. Feedlot operators "purchase feeder cattle and calves at 
I varying weights and feed them to slaughter weight and condition for sale as fed beef,,177 
I 172 Ibid
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I
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I
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I 
I Nonfed beef includes "cull cows and bulls and other cattle not placed in feedlots," and 
usually comes directly from cow-calf producers. 178 
Because the industry is characterized by relatively little vertical integration, 
I market transactions occur at several different levels. Prices of feeder cattle, slaughter 
I cattle and retail prices are all determined simultaneously.179 In addition, prices ofbeef 
I 
cattle are not distinguished on the basis of producer but rather by perceived quality. As a 
result, market participants are price takers. 180 
I In the period from 1945 until 1976, beef consumption in the United States 
boomed. At the end of World War II, Americans consumed on average 71.3 pounds ofI beef and veal. By 1976, that amount had shot up to 129.8 pounds. 181 At about that same 
I time, reports detailing the possible carcinogens found in beef as well as other health 
I hazards associated with diets high in red meat began to appear. These reports, coupled 
with increasing retail prices caused a shift in American's beef consumption patterns with 
I which the industry is still coping. In 1980, consumption dropped to 105.5 pounds per 
capita. 182 By 1996 it had fallen to 67.6 pounds. Consumption seems to have stabilized at I 
about that level. 183 
I 
I Despite the huge decrease in u.S. consumption, beef production is still 
responsible for nearly one-fourth of all U.S. farm income. In 1995, sales of cattle and 
calves totaled $34 billion, and included 18.3 percent of all cash receipts from U. S. farm 
I
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I marketings. l84 Also that year, beef sales represented $50.3 billion of the GOP, or nearly 
one percent of the total. 
• 
The drop in U.S. consumption over the last two decades has urged the U.S. beef 
industry to examine new marketing techniques as well as new markets for its products. 
I In response to health and diet concerns, cattle ranchers and meat packers began "to breed 
. I d ffi 1 ,,185 T d .I· 0 eaner cuts. 0 ay an average roast contams 30 percent simmer amma s an er 
I less fat than it did just 10 years ago and many other cuts ofbeef are as lean as chicken. 186 
I In addition, in cooperation with the United States Department ofAgriculture, beef 
producers began using new labels for beef like Prime, Choice and Select. These labels I 
allowed beef producers to advertise on the package that the meat inside was leaner and of 
I a higher quality. 187 The American BeefCouncil has also initiated a nationwide television 
I marketing strategy dedicated to exacting "greater recognition of beefs positive role in 
healthful diets.,,188 
I Beef producers have also accepted that "exports are the future for growth in the 
I cattle and beefindustry.,,189 In the early 1980's, beef exports accounted for only one-half 
of one percent of beef sold. By 1996 that number had increased to eight percent - the 
I value of these exports totaled over $3.05 billion. 190 In 1994, the United States produced 
I 25.1 percent of the world's beef supply with less than 10 percent of the world's beef 
I
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I animals. 191 These figures make the United States the world's second largest exporter of 
I beef after Australia. Already, American produc\lrs are looking to the "younger, faster 
growing populations in countries with emerging economies for a larger proportion of 
I total beef demand."l92 (See Graph.)193 
I 
I 
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I While targeting foreign populations increases the consumer base to which beef 
I producers sell, it also increases the potential for volatility in the industry "as exchange 
rate fluctuations, domestic policies within primary importing countries and international 
'I 
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I 
I trade policies are reflected in the total demand for U.S. beef"194 These factors have led 
to increased cooperation between American beef producers led by organizations such as 
the National Cattleman's Beef Association (NCBA) and the federal government. NCBA 
I and others have in recent years lobbied strenuously in favor of reduced tariffs and 
I expanded markets. In the early 1990's for example they vigorously supported the 
passage of the free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. 
I 
I What Has NAFTA Meant?
 
From the U.S. beef industry standpoint, NAFTA has been wholly positive.
 I Although the agreement has been criticized for driving down U.S. cattle prices due to an 
I increase in imports from Canada and Mexico, "the fact is that NAFTA did not affect U.S. 
I regulations regarding cattle imports.,,195 The only import restrictions posed by U.S. trade 
laws were health and safety regulations which are still in place. NAFTA'S only major 
I effect therefore was its elimination of tariffs on exports to Mexico. Prior to NAFTA, the 
U.S. imported from I to 1.3 million cattle per year from Canada and Mexico. 196 DuringI 
1994, NAFTA's first year, "exports ofbeef and variety meats to Mexico increased nearly 
I 47 percent in tonnage and 71.5 percent in value."197 The Mexican peso crisis of 1995 
1\ caused a decline in U. S. beef exports that year, but 1996 exports rose by more than 70 
percent. This trend continued into 1997. During the first five months, U.S. beef exports 
I to Mexico were 82.5 percent more than during the same period in 1996. As a result of 
I 
I
 194 Ibid.
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I these figures, Mexico last year overtook Canada to become the second largest export 
I market for U.S. beef and variety meats behind only Japan. 198 
Statistics on U.S. imports ofMexican beef are less clear. While imports of 
I Mexican feeder cattle increased 44.3 percent in the first six months of 1997 compared to 
I imports during the same period in 1997, the increase actually represented a decline in 
imports as compared to the years 1993-95. U.S. imports ofMexican slaughter cattle also I 
seemed to decrease in 1997199 (See chartsfOO 
I 
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I The experiences of the U.S. beef industry under NAFTA are, for the most part 
consistent with the experiences ofU.S. agriculture as a whole. More specifically, in 1996 
I alone NAFTA resulted in agricultural exports to Canada exceeding $6.4 billion and $5 
I 198 "Benefits ofNAFfA Showing in Mexico" NCBA Website. htlp:tnlill.becforgIForcign 
Tradelbonsin1.htm 4 March 1998. 
I 199 Lambert "Cattle Imports." 
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I 
I billion to Mexico. 201 From 1993 to 1996, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico increased 
from $3.6 billion to $5.4 billion. 202 As the largest supplier of agricultural goods to 
Mexico, the U.S. accounts for 75 percent of the country's imports. U.S. agricultural 
I exports to Mexico enjoy an average annual growth rate of 15 percent while the rate for 
I overall U.S. agricultural exports is 12.4 percent. Also from 1993 to 1996, 
combined sales to Mexico of 12 key commodities - com, wheat, field I seeds, vegetable oils, cotton, sugar and related products, barley, pulses, beef and veal, rice and soybeans - rose by $2 billion, up more than 150 
percent.203 I The areas in which U.S. exporters have enjoyed the greatest gains are naturally 
I those areas in which Mexico previously employed high tariffs. Vegetable oils, processed 
I meats and tree nuts, for example were faced with tariffs ranging from 15 to 20 percent. 
Tariffs on animal and vegetable oils, farm animals and meat products were 12.0 and 6.5 
I percent. 204 
I NAFTA has also been an overall benefit to Mexican agriculture. Mexican 
imports to the U.S. "grew from $2.7 billion in 1993 to 3.8 billion in 1996, reflecting an 
I 
I 11.6 percent average annual increase.,,2Q5 This represents a modest increase for most 
areas of Mexican agriculture. Its largest export gains during the period were in fresh and 
processed tomatoes, other vegetables and peanuts. 206 
I
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I 
I Expanding NAFfA 
NAFTA was never intended to remain merely a trilateral pact. Since 1990 when 
President Bush outlined his "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" efforts have been 
I made to improve prospects for other Latin American countries to join in the agreement. 
I The Enterprise for the Americas was a program designed to reduce debt, boost 
investment and remove trade barriers throughout the Western Hemisphere.207 While the 
I program was soon abandoned by the Bush Administration, the excitement it had 
I generated in Latin America was significant. The idea had been planted that eventually, 
countries of Central and South America would be linked economically with the United I 
I 
States. While Chile was the country identified as the one most likely to be named fourth 
I party to the agreement, others began pressuring the U.S. for consideration.208 
Of special importance from a beef industry standpoint is the possibility of the 
addition of Argentina. The Argentine Pampas is world-renowned for the high quality 
I grass-fed beef it produces. Encompassing approximately fifty million hectares, the 
Pampas is an extraordinarily rich agricultural area. 209 Its soils are extremely deep and I 
fertile and rainfall averages range from twenty to forty inches annually.210 The land is 
I 
I devoted primarily to the production of field crops and livestock. Argentine cattle are 
raised on "natural or seeded pasture, forage crops, and some byproducts ofgrain 
production" and are "rarely fattened on harvested grains.,,2\1 This makes Argentine beef 
I 
I increasingly desirable in the United States where health and environmental concerns have 
a significant impact on consumer demand. In 1995, despite a two-year drought which 
I 207 Orrne 159.
 208 Orrne 166.
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I caused a severe shrinkage of the Argentine cattle herd, its exports to the U.S. still totaled 
I 81,000 tons. 212 Argentine export estimates were forecast to increase to 480,000 tons in 
1997 and to 750,000 tons by the year 2000.213 Securing improved access to other North 
I American markets will be a vital part of Argentina's export strategy in the near future. 
I Already, Argentina has undergone negotiations with the U.S. which resulted in its being 
named a "low-risk" country with respect to foot-and-mouth disease. 214 Argentina's
I excellent productive capacity along with the appeal of its product makes its inclusion in 
I NAFTA a potential concern to U. S. beef producers. Currently the U. S. places a 20,000 
ton tariff quota allocation on the importation of Argentine uncooked beef (i.e. chilled orI frozen). The adoption of a trade agreement could thus increase pressure on U.S. beef 
I producers as such restrictions would no longer be in place. 
I While Argentine beef does have the potential to create some competition for the 
U.S. beef industry, Argentina's overall importance to the U.S. is limited. In fact, the 
I significance ofLatin America as a whole is relatively minor. Despite its economic 
I growth in recent years, Latin America still accounts for just fifteen percent ($63 billion in 
1991) of U.S. sales worldwide ($421.8 billion) and Mexico alone makes up half of that 
I figure. 215 From the U.S. perspective, therefore, Latin America without Mexico is still a
 
I
 marginal player.
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I The Future 
I While both U.S. and Mexican gains in agriculture were relatively moderate during 
the first three years of the NAFTA, the agreement does offer the potential for greater I gains in the near future. NAFTA's IS-year phase out period for agricultural trade means 
I that only part of the liberalization required by the agreement has been achieved. This fact 
indicates that gains should continue on both sides at least until 2008 when the phase out I period comes to a close and all trade barriers and TRQs must be eliminated. Aside from 
I mere export increases, NAFTA has had "an overall positive effect on U.S. commodity 
markets, reinforcing the trend toward greater integration of the North American I 
agricultural marketplace.,,216 The warnings of doom and gloom for American workers 
I heard from protectionists and other NAFTA opponents during the 1992 Presidential 
I Election proved to be essentially groundless. The agricultural gains from NAFTA may 
have been modest but they have been gains. 
I 
I In addition, three years ofNAFTA have indicated the mutually important roles 
shared by the United States and Mexico. While the peso crisis of 1995 was Mexico's 
most severe economic recession since the 1930's, both the Mexican economy and U.S. 
I 
I exports recovered more quickly than in the less severe Mexican financial crisis of 1982. 
Part ofthis speedy recovery was due to "economic reforms locked in by NAFTA.,,217 
The greatest benefit of the agreement to Mexico may thus be the improved 
I 
I financial stability that has resulted from the formal linkage with its northern neighbors. 
And from a U.S. standpoint, aiding the Mexican economic recovery was necessary as 
I
 
216 Ibid 90.
 I 217 Ibid iii.
 
I 52 
I
 
I 
I U. S. exports to that country, not only in agriculture but across the board, dropped 
severely. 
Overall then, it is in the interests of both Mexico and the U.S. to maintain their 
I 
I commitments to the North American Free Trade Agreement. The benefits of expanding 
NAFTA to include other countries of Latin America are, at present, not so clear. Without 
Mexico, Latin America accounts for only seven percent of total U.S. trade. In addition, 
I many of its economies, like Brazil and Peru remain in need of serious "reforms to break 
I inflation, spur investment, and settle outstanding debts. ,,218 A free trade agreement with 
these countries would be a risky venture. The potential financial risk faced by U.S. I investors seems unnecessary especially since there is less reliance on the part of the Latin 
I American countries on the U.S. market. While the U.S. is already the region's single 
I biggest export market, it currently accounts for only two-fifths of Latin America's total 
exports.219 Even that figure is high, as Mexico is by far the region's largest exporter. 
I The rest ofLatin American is simply not as dependent on Washington as is Mexico. 
I Rather, many of the countries of Central and South America look to other parts of the 
world for cultivating special economic relationships. Peru, for example has in recent 
I 
I years focused on improving relations with Japan and Chile has forged partnerships in the 
South Pacific. Argentina has for years been linked to Italy as Brazil has to Portugal. 220 
This is not to say that membership in NAFTA should never be extended beyond 
I 
I Mexico. Instead, like the GATT, membership should eventually be open to all countries 
which agree ,to adhere to its requirements and which meet its entrance specifications. 221 
I 218 Orme 170. 
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I First priority however must be the consolidation of the existing North American free 
I trade area. 
The NAFTA is a young institution. From an agricultural standpoint, it is still not 
I even fully underway. While its implications have been positive for essentially all parties 
I thus far, time must be taken to ensure that the new trade relationships develop properly. 
The primary task for the current members ofNAFTA then will be to maintain 
I their commitments to the agreement over the next several years. Where expansion is 
I concerned, new emphasis should be placed on developing special relationships with Latin 
America, but the formal extension of membership should be postponed until the current 
I agreement has had more time to develop. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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